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Translation Without Fidelity
A Response to Richard Epstein’s Fidelity Without Translation
1 Green Bag 2d 21 (1997)

William Michael Treanor

F

ew legal scholars can even dream of
having the eÖect that Richard Epstein
has had on law and on politics, and his
remarkable inÔuence is probably greatest in
the area of takings law. In his brilliantly provocative 1985 book Takings and a series of articles and essays, Professor Epstein has argued
that the takings clause bars government
actions that have redistributive consequences.
His scholarship has pushed the Supreme
Court to a broader reading of the clause (although not as broad as he would like), and it
has helped galvanize a popular movement that
seeks, and that in some cases has obtained,
statutes that require the government to pay
compensation in cases in which courts will not
order it.
Explaining why a body of work is inÔuential is inevitably a complex matter, but part of
the success of Professor Epstein’s writings un-

doubtedly stems from their grounding in the
original understanding of the Constitution.
He has claimed the mantle of the framers, and
that claim gives his reading of the takings
clause a deep resonance it would not otherwise have.
Explicitly rejecting Epstein’s reading of the
clause and the history that lay behind its adoption, I have previously advanced my own view
of the original understanding and, drawing on
Professor Lawrence Lessig’s translation model
of constitutional interpretation, argued that
proper regard for that understanding should
lead us to adopt a political process theory of
the takings clause.1
In his recent essay, Fidelity Without Translation, Epstein takes both Lessig and me to task,
criticizing Lessig’s model and my application
of it (as well as Lessig’s application of his model
to the commerce clause). “We don’t need
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1 William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95
Colum. L. Rev. 782 (1995).
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rareÕed theories of linguistic interpretation
that celebrate the conÔuence of context, structure and changed circumstances,” he writes.
“What we need are careful readings of text that
capture the balance, sense and logic of the original doctrine.”
There is an irony to this criticism. Of all of
the major approaches to the takings clause
that pre-existed Lessig’s work, Epstein's is the
only one that can in any way be said to anticipate Lessig’s translation model. Epstein is thus
criticizing Lessig for preaching what Epstein
practices.
According to Professor Lessig, the translator starts her task by placing constitutional
text in its original historical context, and she
seeks to determine what the text meant in the
setting in which it arose. She then determines
which factual presuppositions that underlay
the original understanding are no longer
accurate. Finally, she reinterprets the text to
respond to these factual changes, altering the
original reading as little as possible while establishing its modern “equivalent.”
In his takings scholarship, Epstein does
something similar. He is not a strict originalist who resolves questions by relying on
concrete historical understandings. (Some
takings scholars supportive of government
regulation have adopted the traditional originalist approach.) Indeed, he Õnds unconstitutional some things that he acknowledges the
framers believed constitutional. At the same
time, unlike most takings scholars, he does
not disregard the original understanding altogether. Strikingly, at the core of Epstein’s
approach to the takings clause is his view of
what the clause meant in 1791. Like Lessig,
Epstein offers a reading that has as its goal the
application of the original doctrine in modern
circumstances.
In describing his methodology, Epstein observes, in Fidelity Without Translation, “[E]ven as
the semantic meaning of given terms remains
constant and unchanged, the class of objects to
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which they apply could change, and could conceivably expand to matters that were beyond
all human imagination in 1787.” This is a
description of a type of translation – it involves
a reading that changes because of changed
circumstances. There is, I admit, a diÖerence
between Epstein’s and Lessig's approaches:
Lessig’s translator searches for underlying
meaning and then translates to preserve meaning; Epstein lets the words themselves do the
work. A word such as “property” translates itself because “the class of objects to which [it]
appl[ies] changes” as society changes. Nonetheless, a person who rejects strict originalism
but still seeks to develop a constitutional
jurisprudence that accords with the original
understanding is engaged in translation, regardless of whether one determines original
understanding by looking to underlying meaning, like Lessig, or to “the internal written logic
of the text,” like Epstein (Takings at 28).
Thus, the real question suggested by Epstein’s essay is not whether translation is a
good idea. Rather, it is whether the readings
Epstein oÖers are good translations. Even
from the perspective of his own methodology,
Epstein’s translation of the takings clause fails.
More important, Lessig’s approach to translation is superior and leads to a better reading of
that clause.

The Textualist Approach to
the Takings Clause
Epstein’s discussion of the takings clause in Fidelity Without Translation begins with the language of the clause itself: “nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” He interprets this language by
looking to the historically-grounded deÕnition
of property. “The standard deÕnition of property from Roman times on down” is that
property is not merely a tangible object, but
“its incidents of use, enjoyment or disposition.” This deÕnition was part of the “back-
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ground materials that were fully available and
widely understood in 1791,” and therefore
should guide our understanding of the clause
today. As a result, when the government diminishes the value of something, it must compensate the property owner because the
property owner’s property has been taken.
Epstein notes that I and other legal historians have found that many regulations existed
at the time of the ratiÕcation of the takings
clause, but he treats this as insigniÕcant. “The
great question,” he writes, “is whether … an
appeal to [the takings clause’s] internal logic
invalidate[s] many of the laws in eÖect in
1787.” He answers that it should. “The basic
logic of the takings clause requires that it reach
partial regulations much as it reaches partial
occupations.” There is no need for translation,
though: “[T]he takings clause as drafted was
equal to its task when read in light of the standard deÕnitions, usages and practices prevalent in its own time.”
The threshold problem with Epstein’s textcentered account is that it ignores part of the
text.
Epstein is absolutely right that in 1791 people understood property to mean “incidents of
use, enjoyment or disposition.” But this deÕnition was not the only deÕnition of property
then current. Another deÕnition of property
was that property was a person’s tangible possessions. An even narrower deÕnition was that
it was a person’s land. Indeed, the same is true
today. Sometimes the word property refers to
tangibles; sometimes it refers to intangibles.
When a word can have a number of diÖerent meanings, a textualist, seeking the word’s
meaning, must look at how the word is used in
the document in conjunction with the words
it is connected to. Thus, while Epstein’s essay
focuses on one word, the takings clause as a
whole must be examined. Read as a unit, the

clause – “nor shall private property be taken
for a public use, without just compensation” –
reÔects a physical conception of property. The
critical word is “taken.” The relevant meaning
of “take” at the time of the takings clause’s
ratiÕcation was “seize,” and seize, in turn, implicates a physical act of control over physical
property. Because the current meanings of
“take” and of “seize” accord with that in the
late eighteenth century, contemporary examples illustrate this point. In California v.
Hodari D.,2 Justice Scalia held for the Court
that an individual who tossed away a rock of
crack cocaine while running from a police
oÓcer had not been “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Scalia
wrote, “From the time of the founding to the
present, the word ‘seizure’ has meant a ‘taking
possession.’ For most purposes at common
law, the word connoted not merely grasping or
applying physical force to the animate or inanimate object in question, but actually bringing
it within physical control.”3 To oÖer a common language illustration: If I were to tell my
daughter she couldn’t play ball in the house, I
would have unquestionably deprived her of an
incident of the enjoyment of the ball, but I
wouldn’t have “taken” the ball from her. I only
“take” the ball from her when I physically seize
it.
In fairness, I must add that, while Epstein’s
essay essentially ignores the word “taken,” the
same is not true of his book Takings. There,
over the course of many pages, he patiently,
through the use of analogies and subtle reasoning, develops the argument that the government takes when it does something that
would be actionable if it were done by a private
party. But his elaborate analysis obscures,
rather than clariÕes. If, like Epstein, one believes that “the takings clause … [should be
read] in light of the standard deÕnitions, us-

2 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
3 Id. at 624.
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ages and practices prevalent in its own time,”
then the meaning of “taken” is clear, and it is
not the broad deÕnition developed in Takings.
Rather, the standard deÕnition of “take” was
to “seize.”
Because the use of the word “taken” makes
apparent that the relevant deÕnition of property is one of the two deÕnitions limited to
physical property, if the takings clause is read
in terms of 1791 usage it means either “nor shall
a person’s tangible possessions be seized for a
public use, without just compensation” or “nor
shall a person’s land be seized for a public use,
without just compensation.” Contrary to
Epstein, then, a purely textualist approach
leads to the view that the takings clause should
not be read to cover regulations. Instead,
under such an approach, the clause should be
read as barring only uncompensated dispossession. It should be recognized that the
meaning of tangible property has changed over
time. For example, in 1791, dogs were not considered property (at least for purposes of common law larceny). Today, if the government
were to seize my dog for a public use – say, to
incorporate her into a canine corps of drugsniÖers – a court applying the textualist approach favored by Epstein would presumably
require compensation. But such changes in the
class of tangible property obviously have no
bearing on the issue of whether regulations
run afoul of the takings clause. Use of Epstein’s
methodology, then, ironically supports the
conclusion that regulations are never takings.

Translation and Underlying
Meaning
Until after the Civil War, the takings clause
enjoyed a consistent reading. While the clause
was not the subject of debate in Congress
when James Madison proposed it, and there
are no reports of relevant debates in the states
that ratiÕed it, Madison’s post-ratiÕcation
writings show that he thought the clause re-
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quired compensation only when property was
physically taken (including when slaves were
freed by the government), not when the value
of property was diminished by regulations.
The early caselaw is to the same eÖect. As a
treatise-writer noted in 1857, “It seems to be
settled that, to entitle the owner to protection
under this clause, the property must be
actually taken in the physical sense of the
word … .”
These readings are at odds with Epstein’s
depiction of the “internal logic” of the takings
clause. His essay suggests that the driving
force of the clause is antiredistributionism. In
his book Takings, Epstein develops this argument (in a way that he does not do in the essay) by appealing not merely to textual
exegesis, but to history. “The Lockean system
was dominant at the time when the Constitution was adopted,” he writes (Takings at 16),
and further observes that “the founders shared
Locke’s and Blackstone's aÖection for private
property, which is why they inserted the eminent domain provision in the Bill of Rights.”
(p. 29). The takings clause therefore embodied
the Lockean principle that “whenever any portion of [his property] is taken from [the property-owner], he must receive from the state …
some equivalent or greater beneÕt as part of
the same transaction.” (p. 15). This principle is
said to apply equally to regulations and to
physical dispossessions.
Thus, as noted, Epstein argues that the
clause’s “internal logic” means that regulations
of the type that were in place in 1791 are unconstitutional. As a purely analytic matter,
this is a plausible move and, as Epstein points
out in his essay, it is a standard move in modern equal protection law. Takings provides a
helpful example of how this argument works
in the takings context:
[The framers] may have meant to endorse
both the takings clause and wage and price
controls without knowing the implicit tension
between them. If they cannot have both, then
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their explicit choice takes precedence over
their silent one. Suppose the framers believed
both A and X, when A entails not-X. If A is
the constitutional text, then X is not allowed.
(p. 28)

The Ôaw in the argument is that it only works
if the takings clause was originally understood
to bar some antiredistributive regulations, but
not others. Were that the case, then one could
plausibly contend that the framers failed to
grasp the fact that certain regulations they
thought permissible actually ran afoul of the
principle of antiredistribution. The fact, however, that the original understanding – regardless of whether one views that understanding
through text or historical practice – was that
no regulations violated the takings clause indicates that the internal logic of the takings
clause is not simple antiredistributionism. In
other words, to use Epstein’s symbols, there is
no tension between A and X because A is not
what Epstein believes it to be.
So what was the original internal logic of
the takings clause? Why did it bar dispossession, but not regulation? To answer these
questions, it is Õrst necessary to recognize that
the founding generation did not have the simple commitment to Lockeanism that Epstein
posits in Takings. Rather, as a substantial body
of historical scholarship produced over the last
thirty years has shown, the founding generation’s worldview reÔected both the presence of
the communitarian philosophy of republicanism – in which property is held subject to the
demands of the common good as those demands are established by majoritarian decisionmakers – and the Lockean liberalism
which Epstein describes. The scope of the takings clause reÔects a balancing of these two
competing views, an attempt to give majoritarian decisionmakers freedom where their decisionmaking was most worthy of deference and
to restrain them where their decisionmaking
was most suspect.
In general, the framers of the Constitution

constructed a document that reÔected republican attitudes toward property (using property here in the broad sense of property as
value). So long as they acted within the scope
of federal power, majoritarian decisionmakers
could limit property rights. The takings clause
represents an exception to this general rule. It
deÕned an area – dispossession – in which majoritarian decisionmakers could not trump individual rights. The takings clause is the
liberal hole in the republican donut.
So, why did dispossession merit special
treatment? The answer is that, for the framing
generation, physical property was peculiarly at
risk in the political process. In particular,
Madison, the author of the takings clause, believed that the two groups whose property
claims the national government was most
likely to treat unfairly were landowners and
slaveowners. He thought that most property
interests were adequately protected by the
structural safeguards described in Federalist 10
because factions were willing to enter into
deals with each other. But landowners and
slaveowners were likely to be shut out of the
bargaining process. He anticipated that landowners would soon be a minority, and slaveowners already were. His writings and his
statements at the constitutional convention
reÔect his fear that a hostile majority, rather
than negotiating with slaveowners and landowners, would consistently advance its ends at
the expense of these minorities. The takings
clause, then, represents Madison’s attempt to
provide these groups with the protection that
they could not get through normal political
bargaining: if the national government took
land or freed slaves, compensation would be
owed. Heightened constitutional protection
was provided for the limited categories of
cases in which unfairness was most likely.
Changed circumstances have created a gap
between the ends the takings clause was intended to promote and the concrete circumstances in which the clause was originally
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understood to require compensation. Slavery
is, obviously and thankfully, a moot use. Contrary to Madison’s expectations, most Americans are landowners. Thus, the choice raised
by the debate about translation is particularly
evident in the takings realm. Do we read the
clause to mandate compensation only when
there is dispossession? Such a reading could
only appeal to a strict originalist. Given the
political power of landowners – indeed, as
Professor Daniel Farber has observed, “compensation for physical invasions is almost universal in democracies” – to limit the takings
clause to instances of dispossession is to make
it trivial, protecting only those who are wellequipped to protect themselves. At the same
time, it fails to protect those whose property
interests are most at risk in the political process. Such a result thwarts what the framers
were trying to do.
A similar point can be made about the Epsteinian text-based approach to the original
understanding. As argued in the previous section, although Epstein would have it go elsewhere, his approach leads to the conclusion
that dispossessions are takings, but regulations
aren’t. Again, given what the framers were
trying to do, that result is perverse because it
protects those best-equipped to defend their
interests through the political process while it
leaves unprotected those who are most likely to
be victimized by process failure.
Translation avoids this problem. Lessig’s
model of translation shares the major virtue of
strict originalism and Epstein’s approach:
Judges decide not based on their own values,
but on the basis of considered decisions made
by “We the People” in ratifying the Constitution and its amendments. But, when translating, the aspect of the framers’ decision that is
relevant to modern decisionmaking is the
framers’ values and the ends they were seeking
to achieve. As a result, courts, by translating,
implement the framers’ vision and respect
their basic choices, rather than blocking what
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they were trying to do and rendering the Constitution an anachronism.
In the context of the takings clause, translation leads to a process-failure theory since the
framers’ underlying purpose was to provide
heightened protection for property in those
situations in which the political system was
particularly unlikely to consider the claims of
property owners fairly. In the contemporary
context, unfairness is particularly likely to occur when legislation singles out an individual
or a small group of people. When a large number of people are potentially aÖected by a proposed statute or regulation, they can protect
themselves through the political process, engaging in logrolling to ensure that they are not
forced to bear an undue share of the public’s
burden. The same is not true when a proposal
aÖects a few people or, worse, one person.
Public choice theory tells us that such groups,
by simple virtue of the fact that they are a tiny
part of the polity, are poorly situated for engaging in political trades. They are eÖectively
shut out – just as Madison feared slaveowners
and landowners would be. A similar point can
be made about racial minorities. Much of
modern constitutional law has been premised
on the belief that racial minorities are disadvantaged in the political process. This belief is
of particular relevance in the area of environmental racism, and the empirical evidence to
date indicates that minority communities bear
more than their fair share of locally undesirable land uses. Thus, under a translation of
the takings clause, courts should scrutinize
with particular care government acts that single out the property interests of individuals or
small groups and they should similarly scrutinize government acts that specially burden the
property interests of minorities. Outside of
these limited areas in which process failure is
most likely, courts should defer to majoritarian decisionmakers, just as, under the takings
clause as it was originally understood, majoritarian decisionmakers were deferred to except

1 Green Bag 2d 177

Winter 1998.book : Treanor.fm Page 183 Monday, January 26, 1998 1:19 AM

Translation Without Fidelity
where process failure was most likely.
While Epstein approves of my view that the
takings clause applies to regulations, he criticizes me for not following his lead and concluding that all regulations that have
redistributive consequences are takings. He
writes, “The basic logic of the takings clause
requires that it reach partial regulations much
as it reaches partial occupations. But Treanor
will not go that far, without explaining why.”
The explanation is that there is no one principle behind the original understanding of the
takings clause. Rather, there are two. The takings clause is antiredistributionist, as Epstein
correctly argues. Antiredistributionism is its
animating principle. But equally important is
its limiting principle. Majoritarian decisionmakers are free to make decisions about property rights except in those limited categories of
cases in which their decisionmaking is particularly suspect. It is only in this limited category of cases that the animating principle
comes into play.
When the framers protected property only

against dispossession, they balanced their
competing commitments. The translation approach that I have advanced also reÔects a balance, with the diÖerence being that the
translation approach strikes the balance in a
way that accords with modern circumstance.
Epstein’s understanding of the takings clause
as embodying only antiredistributionism
looks to only one side of the balance. Lord
Macauley famously observed that the Constitution is “all sail, and no anchor.” He is
obviously wrong. But Epstein misreads the
Constitution in the opposite direction. He
gives us a Constitution that is all anchor and
no sail, one that ignores the fact that the
founders gave tremendous deference to majoritarian decisionmakers. And so, when
Epstein argues, “What we need are careful
readings of text that capture the balance, sense
and logic of the original doctrine,” I Õnd myself in agreement with him. What he has
failed to see is that this is precisely what the
translation model interpretation of the takings
clause does. B
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